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            12-27對外經濟貿易大學信息學院任龍助理教授: Financing Small and Medium-Size Enterprises via Retail Platforms

              時間:2019年12月27日9:00-10:00  

              地點:主樓429 

              報告內容簡介: 

              We study the multifaceted impact of loan programs initiated by a retail platform to its sellers on these sellers’ operational and financing decisions, profits of the sellers and the platform, as well as consumer welfare. Many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) on retail platforms face capital constraints that limit their ability to meet market demand. Due to lack of sufficient asset and credit history, SMEs also face the challenge of securing loans from traditional banks. Therefore, the financial loan decisions of a retail platform to its SMEs have become an essential part of the platform design. We develop a two-stage game-theoretic model where multiple SMEs who face financial constraints compete on a retail platform, and the platform decides who to offer financial loans and what are the loan credit lines. We show that the competitive landscape on the platform greatly affects the effectiveness of the platform's loan programs. Offering a generous loan to a monopoly seller on the platform benefits all stakeholders. Offering generous loans to competing sellers, however, can make sellers worse-off in the equilibrium where they are willing to accept the loans -- a prisoner's dilemma. The platform can, by strategically setting the loan limit, reduce the intensity of the prisoner's dilemma for sellers in high or moderate need of funds. Two factors -- the platform's required rate of return and referral fee -- affect the platform's willingness-to-lend and the interaction between the platform and the sellers. We also find that offering asymmetric loans to symmetric competing sellers can benefit both the platform and the sellers as a whole. The research findings provide useful implications for retail platforms on how to offer financial loans to sellers based not only on an individual seller's characteristics but also on the competition in the marketplace. From a government perspective, our research also sheds light on the impact of a platform's loan decisions on consumer welfare and how such decisions should be regulated.

              報告人簡介: 

              任龍,對外經濟貿易大學助理教授,于2018年從清華大學經濟管理學院取得博士學位,圣路易斯華盛頓大學訪問學者。他的研究興趣包括運營管理、電子商務與優化,以第一或者通訊作者在國際國內主流期刊《Fuzzy Sets & Systems》《International Journal of Production Economics》《中國管理科學》《管理工程學報》等發表論文近十篇,作為主持人承擔教育部人文社科青年項目1項,目前擔任國際期刊《Decision Sciences》《Electronic Commerce Research and Applications》《IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy sets and Systems》《IEEE Access》《International Journal of Production Economics》等雜志的審稿人,同時也是INFORMS、POMS、SIAM、IEEE協會會員。

             ?。ǔ修k:管理科學與物流系、科研與學術交流中心)

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